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CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS: A NEW BASIS FOR
TRACING EQUITIES
BERNARD E. GEGAN*
In drafting the Restatement of Restitution, the reporters set
forth the most basic and inclusive principle in Section one: "[a]
person who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is
required to make restitution to the other."' A recent decision
handed down unanimously by the New York Court of Appeals re-
solved an issue going to the heart of this principle.2
In 1960, Frederick Simonds and his wife of fourteen years,
Mary, entered into a separation agreement which was later incorpo-
rated in a divorce decree.3 As part of the agreement, Frederick prom-
ised to keep his life insurance policies in force and to keep Mary as
beneficiary of no less than $7,000 thereof. Additionally, if the insur-
ance should lapse or be cancelled, Frederick would procure new
insurance to honor his obligation to Mary.4 Several months later
Frederick married Reva and a daughter, Gayle, was born of this
marriage. In 1962, Frederick took out two life insurance policies:
one, which ultimately paid $16,138.83, named Reva as beneficiary;
the second, which finally paid $5,566.00, named Gayle as benefici-
ary. In addition, Frederick changed jobs in 1967 and acquired a
$34,000.00 group life policy, naming Reva as beneficiary.5
When Frederick died insolvent in 1971, Reva and Gayle col-
lected insurance proceeds of $50,138.83 and $5,566.00 respectively.
Mary collected nothing, however, because the policies covered by
the separation agreement were not in existence at the time of Fred-
erick's death.8 On these facts, the Court of Appeals in Simonds v.
Simonds affirmed a summary judgment granting Mary a $7,000
constructive trust on the proceeds of the 1962 policy collected by
Reva.7 Since there was no evidence that Reva induced Frederick to
breach his contract with Mary so as to incur liability in tort for
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. B.S., 1959, LL.B., 1961, St.
John's University; LL.M., Harvard University, 1962.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1936).
Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 380 N.E.2d 189, 408 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1978).
Id. at 237, 380 N.E.2d at 191, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
'Id.
Id. at 238, 380 N.E.2d at 192, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 361.
The Court noted that "it does not appear from the record why, how or when" the
policies were permitted to lapse. Id.
I Id. at 241, 380 N.E.2d at 193, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
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Mary's loss, the sole issue was whether Reva was unjustly enriched
at the expense of Mary. There was no doubt that Reva received a
benefit and that Mary suffered a loss; the precise question was
whether the one was "at the expense of" the other.
The best starting point for analyzing this question is to suppose
hypothetically that Frederick simply changed the beneficiary of an
original $7,000 policy from Mary to Reva. Under such circumstan-
ces, it is clear that Mary could obtain specific restitution from Reva,
on the ground that the holder of a prior equity in an asset prevails
over a subsequent holder of the legal title who paid no value.8
Although Frederick retained the legal power to change the ben-
eficiary by so providing in his contract of insurance, he incurred a
duty not to do so by his separate contract with Mary. By this sepa-
rate contract, Mary acquired not only a personal right against Fred-
erick but also a latent equity in Frederick's contract right against
the insurer.9 Therefore, if Frederick later changed the beneficiary to
Reva in breach of his contract with Mary, Reva, as a donee benefici-
ary, would take her legal rights subject to Mary's prior equity in the
subject matter. Of course, Mary's equity in the contract would also
carry over to the proceeds paid to Reva as the directly traceable
product thereof.
On the actual facts in Simonds, however, the policies of which
Reva and Gayle were the beneficiaries were different contracts from
the ones in which Mary had an equitable interest. In the absence of
any proof that the premiums paid for the former were from funds
equitably pledged to the latter,10 the most that can be said is that
both sets of rights were similar in kind and both were measured by
the same life-Frederick. Lest this factor be given undue weight in
identifying Mary's interest in one policy with Reva's interest in
another, it should be noted that life insurance is not a contract of
indemnity; it is not compensation for a specific loss which, if pres-
ent, might tie the two interests together. For example, if Frederick
' Lengel v. Lengel, 86 Misc. 2d 460, 382 N.Y.S.2d 678 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1976);
Richards v. Richards, 58 Wis. 2d 290, 206 N.W.2d 134 (1973).
' Stronge v. Knights of Pythias, 189 N.Y. 346, 82 N.E. 433 (1907); Zies v. New York Life
Ins. Co. 237 App. Div. 367, 261 N.Y.S. 709 (1st Dep't 1933); Salinas v. Salinas, 187 Misc.
509, 62 N.Y.S. 2d 385 (1946).
11 If an insured uses stolen money to pay life insurance premiums, the owner may impress
a constructive trust on the proceeds in the proportion which the premiums paid with his
money bear to the total amount of premiums paid. Holmes v. Gilman, 138 N.Y. 369, 34 N.E.
205 (1893); Baxter House, Inc. v. Rosen, 27 App. Div. 2d 258, 278 N.Y.S.2d 442 (2d Dep't
1967). If the insured pays premiums with his own money while insolvent, in actual fraud of
his creditors, they have an equitable lien on the proceeds equal to the amount of premiums
so paid. Id. at 260-61 & nn.1&2; see N.Y. INS. LAW § 166(4) (McKinney 1966).
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had equitably assigned the right to recover proceeds from a fire
insurance policy on Blackacre to Mary as security for a debt," al-
lowed that policy to lapse, taken out another from a different insurer
and gratuitously assigned in writing the proceeds to be realized
therefrom to Reva, it could then be argued that there is a nexus
between the proceeds eventually realized by Reva and those pre-
viously promised to Mary. Both would have represented compensa-
tion for the same measurable loss, albeit through different contrac-
tual paths. There is no connection, however, between the "worth"
of a life that is insured and the proceeds realized from any particular
policy. The insurable interest may be duplicated among several
persons and the insured may have as many policies as he desires,
in as large amounts as he can afford. Similar to the relation between
different winning tickets on the same racehorse, if one life insurance
policy lapses it is wholly arbitrary to say that any other specific
policy is a substitute for it, so that third-party equities in the one
transfer to the other.
In summary, while Mary's equity was prior to Reva's rights, it
was in respect of a different res.1 2 Nevertheless, the Court held
Reva's policy to be "a substitute" res for Mary's.1 3 In so concluding,
it must have been crucial that both were at least the same kind of
property: rights in life insurance. If Frederick had simply promised
Mary a $7,000 bequest in his will, no court would translate that into
an equity in Reva's life insurance proceeds. Conversely, if Mary had
been promised life insurance and Reva given an annuity or trust
income in Frederick's will, there could be no basis for a constructive
trust.
" See Cromwell v. Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co., 44 N.Y. 42 (1870).
I2 An analogy may be drawn to a line of cases beginning with Patrick v. Metcalf, 37 N.Y.
332 (1867), and Butterworth v. Gould, 41 N.Y. 450 (1869), in which a single obligor is con-
fronted with two adverse claimants, X and Y. If the obligor chooses to pay X, Y cannot
thereafter sue X for money had and received to his use even if it is established that Y had
the superior right to payment. As long as Y still has his original claim against the obligor, he
cannot question the sufficiency of X's entitlement to the payment he received from the
obligor. See also Smith v. Goldsborough, 236 N.Y. 340, 140 N.E. 718 (1923); Murphy v. Ball,
38 Barb. 262 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Orange County 1862).
The rule applies only where Y's claim is independent in its origin from that of X. This is
the point of analogy to the reference in the text to a different res. In contrast, if X and Y
both trace their claims, through assignment, inheritance or otherwise, to the same original
debt, then the courts have been willing to identify the money in the hands of X with the
unsatisfied claim of Y and allow the action for money had and received. Casey v. Lincoln
Nat'l Bank, 83 App. Div. 91, 82 N.Y.S. 525 (2d Dep't 1903); Brown v. Brown, 40 Hun 418
(N.Y. 3d Dep't 1886); Carnegie Trust Co. v. Battery Place Realty Co., 67 Misc. 452, 122
N.Y.S. 697 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1910); Webb v. Myers, 64 Hun 11, 18 N.Y.S.711
(1st Dep't 1892).
" 45 N.Y.2d at 239-40, 380 N.E.2d at 193, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
1979]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Yet what is the magic in similar kinds of property if there is no
other connection between what was promised to Mary and what was
given to Reva? Surely, if Frederick had promised to bequeath a
specific block of stock in his portfolio to Mary but disposed of it
during his lifetime, Mary would have no right to a constructive trust
upon different stock left to other legatees. Similarly, if Mary had
been promised a devise of Blackacre, which Frederick later sold, she
would stand only as a general estate creditor with respect to White-
acre and Greenacre devised to Reva and Gayle. Indeed, to disclaim
a rule of substituted equities with respect to other forms of property
and adopt it with respect to different life insurance policies creates
a paradox. At least one who is contractually entitled to a legacy of
securities or a parcel of land would have a cause of action for breach
of contract enforceable against estate assets in priority to the rights
of the legatees under the will. In the case of life insurance, the
beneficiary's rights are exempt from the claims of creditors of the
deceased. 4 As a simple contract creditor of Frederick, therefore,
Mary could not reach the life insurance proceeds paid to Reva and
Gayle.
The Significance of Frederick's Promise to Replace Lapsed Policies
In the 1960 separation agreement, Frederick not only promised
Mary that he would keep his existing insurance in effect, but addi-
tionally agreed to "procure additional insurance" should the exist-
ing policies ever lapse. The Court of Appeals relied on this clause
to fortify its conclusion that Mary's interest in the lapsed policy
"transferred" to the "substituted policies.' 5 Whether the supple-
mentary promise has such significance in turn depends on what the
Court meant by characterizing the policies in effect at Frederick's
death as "substitutes" for the original ones.
The Court acknowledged that Mary's equity would be "easier
to trace" if the policies payable to Reva were "quid pro quo" re-
placements for the original policies.1 6 Expanding the concept of sub-
stitution, the Court reasoned that inability to trace in the tradi-
tional sense might be excused "much as in the instance of damages
difficult to prove."' 7 Yet if the issuance of one policy is unconnected
" N.Y. INS. LAw § 166 (McKinney 1966).
" 45 N.Y.2d at 239-40, 380 N.E.2d at 193, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
" Id.; see Dixon v. Dixon, 184 So. 2d 478 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966), affl'd, 194 So. 2d 897 (Fla.
1967); Locomotive Eng'r Mut. Life & Accident Ins. Ass'n v. Locke, 251 App. Div. 146, 295
N.Y.S. 689 (4th Dep't 1937), affl'd, 277 N.Y. 584, 13 N.E.2d 781 (1938).
17 45 N.Y.2d at 240, 380 N.E.2d at 193, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 362 (citation omitted). The Court
[Vol. 53:593
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in time and motive from the lapse of another, in what sense is the
one a "substitute" for the other? The difficulty is not so much with
the burden of proof as with what it is that is to be proved. As to this,
the Court's holding is that Frederick's continuing contractual obli-
gation to Mary to "procure additional insurance" translated per se
into a joint and several equity in any and all life insurance he took
out during his lifetime.18 It rests on the idea that one sh'ould be just
before he is generous. While Frederick had an unperformed duty to
constitute Mary as creditor beneficiary of the life insurance, he had
no power in equity to constitute anyone else as donee beneficiary.
Additionally, the Court apparently was willing to have the equity
spring backward in time as well as foreward, since there was no
evidence of the chronology between the policies payable to Reva and
the lapse of the policy originally payable to Mary.
Insofar as the executory promise to name Mary as beneficiary
of a $7,000 insurance policy is comparable to a promise to assign
one, the analogy is unfavorable to the Court's conclusion. While
equity will give effect to an assignment of a fund to arise in the
future, the subject-matter of the equitable assignment must be cap-
able of specific ascertainment, such as the proceeds of a particular
lawsuit," money to be earned under an identified contract, 0 or an
inheritance from a named testator." But where the assignment is
did not identify particular difficulties of tracing and it is not apparent what they might be.
The cases of change of beneficiary and replacement of policies by the insurer have been easily
established by conventional proofs. Even a scheme of "substitution" engineered by the
insured himself, in which he might cancel a policy with one company and take out a new
policy with another, would not seem particularly resistant to proof. An examination of com-
pany records could establish unities upon which to base an inference of substitution. Where
the changed circumstances of years separate the lapse of one policy from the acquisition of
another, however, or where the other is acquired even years prior to the lapse of an older
policy, then it is impossible to conclude that motives of substitution were at work.
I Although the Court affirmed a lower court judgment impressing a $7,000 "constructive
trust" (perhaps more appropriately styled an equitable lien) on the proceeds of one particular
policy payable to Reva, the Court stated unequivocally that the plaintiffs equity attached to
"all the substituted insurance policies, whether they named the second wife or daughter as
beneficiary. . . . The beneficiaries are jointly and severally liable, if the analogy applicable
to constructive trusts be applied." 45 N.Y.2d at 243, 380 N.E.2d at 195, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 364
(citation omitted).
1' See Law Research Serv., Inc. v. Martin Lutz Appellate Printers, Inc., 498 F.2d 836 (2d
Cir. 1974); Williams v. Ingersoll, 89 N.Y. 508 (1882); Stathos v. Murphy, 26 App. Div. 2d 500,
276 N.Y.S.2d 727 (1st Dep't 1966), aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 883, 227 N.E.2d 880, 281 N.Y.S.2d 81
(1967).
2Downs v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 14 N.Y.2d 266, 200 N.E.2d 204, 251 N.Y.S.2d
19 (1964); Hinkle Iron Co. v. Kohn, 229 N.Y. 179, 128 N.E. 113 (1920); Field v. City of New
York, 6 N.Y. 179 (1852).
21 In re Leonhouser's Will, 183 Misc. 863, 51 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sur. Ct. Bronx County 1944);
In re Cornell's Will, 170 Misc. 638, 12 N.Y.S.2d 162 (Sur. Ct. Queens County 1939). See also
19791
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unrelated to any identified source, it adds nothing to the assignor's
personal promise to pay and gives the creditor no security for his
claim.2 Consequently, if Frederick had attempted to make an as-
signment of $7,000 worth of future insurance to Mary, and had
subsequently acquired specific policies payable to his own estate,
Mary would have no preference over any other general creditor.
The Court's expanded idea of substitution also finds little sup-
port in the analogy of debtor-creditor law. One who is under an
unperformed obligation may indeed be generous before he is
just-as long as he is not insolvent.? If the creditor sits on his rights
until his debtor is insolvent, he cannot seek to set aside gifts made
during solvency.
The implicit principle of laches has additional relevance to
the Simonds decision. Mary had enforceable rights against Fred-
erick during his lifetime. His duty to maintain her as beneficiary of
existing insurance was not only arguably subject to specific perform-
ance, but also was enforceable at law. Mary could have sued for
breach or even kept the policy alive herself, with a claim against
Frederick for restitution of the premium payments. u It should be
noted, however, that unless Frederick was insolvent when he al-
lowed Mary's policy to lapse, a fact which nowhere appears, Mary
had no grounds for an objection during Frederick's lifetime to his
payment of premiums on other insurance in favor of Reva and
Gayle. Thus, if Frederick's provision of insurance protection for his
wife and child would not have been considered a wrong to Mary
during Frederick's lifetime, it is a dubious analysis which makes the
avails thereof subject to Mary's claim after Frederick's death.
Stated differently, if prompt and diligent pursuit of Mary's reme-
dies during Frederick's lifetime would not have included a right to
set aside or cancel his other policies, it is difficult to accept the
conclusion that a constructive trust on the avails is the added re-
Williams Press v. Flovin, 35 N.Y.2d 499, 323 N.E.2d 693, 364 N.Y.S.2d 154 (1974).
" Jules-Wallace & Co. v. R.A. Management, Inc., 148 Misc. 180, 265 N.Y.S. 202 (Sup.
Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1933); Cooper v. Douglass, 44 Barb. 409 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Kings County
1864) (attempted assignment of wages to become due for services on any voyage on any ship);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACS § 166, Illustration 2 (1932).
A similar requirement of specificity applies to the corpus of an express trust. For exam-
ple, where one who owns securities in a named company declares that shares now owned, and
to be purchased in the future, are to be held in trust, the trust will fail for uncertainty in the
subject matter. Edgar v. Fitzpatrick, 377 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1964); A. Scorr, THE LAW OF
TRusTs § 76 (1967).
23 N.Y. DEBT. & CRFD. LAW § 273 (McKinnney 1925).
'4 In re Montgomery's Estate, 299 Pa. 452, 149 A. 705 (1930); G. PALMER, THE LAW OF
REsTuTION § 10.5 (1978).
[Vol. 53:593
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ward for procrastination until Frederick's death-especially when
the widow and child presumably have relied on the unchallenged
existence of certain insurance for their future support and it is now
too late to supplement the estate plan with additional insurance.2
The notion of a floating equity unrooted in traceable substitu-
tions of the asset subject thereto, capable of being held in suspen-
sion and attaching to property similar in kind subsequently, or even
previously, acquired by the obligor is an unprecedented and dubious
doctrine. For example, to extend an analogy given earlier, suppose
that Frederick had agreed with Mary to bequeath specific General
Motors (GM) stock which he promised to retain in his portfolio and,
moreover, to acquire and bequeath other stock of equal value if the
GM stock should somehow be disposed of. If Frederick sold the GM
stock iand breached his promise to bequeath Mary a substitute
stock, would her remedies include a constructive trust against GM
stock, or other stock, subsequently acquired and bequeathed to
Reva and Gayle? It is suggested that the answer must be no. Were
Frederick's estate solvent at the time of his death, Mary's remedy
at law would be adequate. If the estate were insolvent, to give Mary
specific restitution against the legatees of stock would arbitrarily
prefer her over other creditors.26
Among competing creditors of an insolvent obligor, no prefer-
ence can be obtained by invoking the technique of involuntary sub-
stitution without tracing. If the obligor dissipates an asset which is
subject to an equity, the equity is lost and the claimant retains only
an in personam claim as a general creditor. As Judge Andrews sum-
marized it in the leading case of Fur & Wool Trading Co. v. Fox:2
"No identification-no lien." 2r Even where the obligor acquires new
I On the potential for irrevocable change of position in reliance on having received
payment, see Pickslay v. Starr, 149 N.Y. 432, 44 N.E. 163 (1896); Haviland v. Willets, 141
N.Y. 35, 35 N.E. 958 (1894). It does not appear in the facts in Simonds when Mary learned
that the policy in her favor had lapsed, but as between her and Reva she was in the best
position to protect herself by diligence. Her laxity in this respect may be traced to the original
separation agreement, in which she relied soley on Frederick's promise without obtaining an
assignment of the policy.
2 Preferring Mary over other creditors would be in contravention of N.Y. Suna. CT. Pnoc.
Acr § 1811 (McKinney 1966). See Woodruff v. H.B. Claflin Co., 198 N.Y. 470, 91 N.E. 1103
(1910). Indeed, it is arguable that Mary's rights against estate assets would be subordinate
to the claims of general creditors. "The breach of this obligation to make a testamentary
provision would not constitute the wife a true creditor; it would merely give rise to a right in
equity to enforce the obligation of the husband." In re Tanenbaum's Estate, 258 App. Div.
285, 289, 16 N.Y.S.2d 507, 510 (2d Dep't 1939). See also In re Hoyt's Estate, 174 Misc. 512,
21 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1940).
245 N.Y. 215, 156 N.E. 670 (1927).
Id. at 218, 156 N.E. at 671.
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assets of the same type as those dissipated, unless he did so with
the intent to make restitution,2 they do not become subject to the
previous equity on a theory of involuntary substitution. For exam-
ple, if an embezzler deposits stolen money in his bank account and
thereafter depletes the balance below the amount owed to his vic-
tim, subsequent deposits of his own money do not become subject
to the equitable lien.? Although the wrongdoer in such a case has
as compelling a duty toward his victim as Frederick did toward
Mary, the law views the new deposits as simply part of the wrong-
doer's general assets, as to which the embezzlement victim has no
claim superior to that of any other general creditor. Moreover, the
Court of Appeals has stated that, unless the claimant's money or
property can be traced into a particular fund or piece of property
in the obligor's estate, "[t]he equitable doctrine that as between
creditors equality is equity, admits, so far as we know, of no excep-
tion founded on the greater supposed sacredness of one debt.., or
that its loss involves greater apparent hardship in one case than in
another.""
It is of course true that Simonds did not involve a dispute
between competing creditors in an insolvent's estate, although such
a problem doubtless lurked in the background. The contest on ap-
peal was between Mary, a contract creditor, and Reva, a donee
beneficiary. But the beneficiary of life insurance, particularly the
widow, is no ordinary donee beneficiary, because her rights are ex-
empt from the claims of general estate creditors. Consequently, the
refusal of the law to dilute the requirements of tracing in the one
case might point the way to wisdom in the other.
Paradoxically, it is hard to resist the temptation to suspect that
it was the very fact that Reva's insurance proceeds were exempt
from Mary's claim as a contract creditor of Frederick that led the
Court to search for another theory whereby she could share. After
all, Mary gave consideration and Reva gave none; Mary's contract
right to receive insurance protection was a valueless claim against
Frederick's insolvent estate; so why should Reva collect in full while
Mary goes empty-handed? From each according to her ability and
to each according to her need may represent the new equity of
redistribution, but it hardly represents the traditional equity of en-
titlement.
' See, e.g., In re Gottfried Baking Co., 312 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
1o RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 212 (1936); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 202,
comment j (1959); G. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTrrUTION § 2.16 (1978).
3, Cavin v. Gleason, 105 N.Y. 256, 262, 11 N.E. 504, 506 (1887).
[Vol. 53:593
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Whatever the Court's reasons, its result was to prefer one kind
of estate creditor above others of presumably equal merit and con-
currently subordinate the one kind of disposition on death which
normally enjoys an exemption not given to others. More specifically,
with respect to no other asset passing on death would Mary have a
claim superior to any other creditor of Frederick; and with respect
to no other creditor of Frederick would Reva's insurance proceeds
be in any way subject to a claim.
CONCLUSION: BEYOND TRACING
The central theme of the Court's opinion in Simonds is found
in the statement: "Had the husband kept his promise, the benefici-
aries would have collected $7,000 less in proceeds. To that extent,
the beneficiaries have been unjustly enriched, and the proceeds
should be subjected to a constructive trust. '3
If these statements were demonstrably true, the holding could
be justified on the basic principle of restitution set forth at the
beginning of this comment, whatever doubts might exist concern-
ing the Court's use of tracing principles. The difficulty is that, on
the evidence as the Court set it forth, the statement is an unproved
and gratuitous assumption.3 In contrast to the case of a promise to
make a will, in which any legacy in derogation of that promise is
necessarily at the expense of the promisee, the provision of insur-
ance in favor of Reva and Gayle was not necessarily at the expense
of Frederick's committment to Mary. Although he was insolvent
when he died in 1971, we do not know how long that condition
u 45 N.Y.2d at 243, 380 N.E.2d at 195, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 364.
" The nearest approach to support for such an assumption was made by the Appellate
Division in Simonds, when it cited the situation of a contract to make a will. 58 App. Div.
2d 305, 311, 396 N.Y.S.2d 547, 552 (4th Dep't 1977). Although such contracts are not specifi-
cally enforced during the lifetime of the promisor, the same end result is achieved by impress-
ing a constructive trust on the inheritance of donee legatees. Ludwicki v. Guerin, 57 Cal. 2d
127, 367 P.2d 415, 17 Cal. Rptr. 823 (1961); Winne v. Wine, 166 N.Y. 263,59 N.E. 832 (1901);
Colby v. Colby, 81 Hun 221, 30 N.Y.S. 677 (5th Dep't 1894); Schweizer v. Schweizer, 16 Misc.
2d 592, 184 N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County), aff'd, 8 App. Div. 2d 946, 190 N.Y.S.2d
481 (2d Dep't 1959); 1 PAGE, LAw oF WjLLS §§ 10.27-.37 (W. Bowe & D. Parker ed. 1960).
Although this rule goes beyond conventional tracing of specifically identified assets, it does
lie within the requirement that the defendant's enrichment must be at the expense of the
plaintiff. Where the testator has contractually promised to leave the whole or a specific
proportion of his property at death to P, when the promisor dies his estate forms a defined
quantity, unwarranted bequests of which necessarily diminish the subject-matter of P's prior
contractual right. Even here, P's right more nearly resembles those of a general creditor than
the holder of an equitable title to a specific asset. There is no case giving the contract-legatee
priority over other general creditors of the promisor, as would be so with a constructive trust
based on traceable equitable ownership of specific assets of the estate.
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existed. Nor do we know when he allowed the policies payable to
Mary to lapse, or even if they lapsed before he obtained the insur-
ance payable to Reva and Gayle. Indeed, Frederick may have been
financially capable of keeping all of the policies in force at all times.
How, then, could the Court reasonably assume that Reva and Gayle
would have been beneficiaries of less insurance had Frederick not
breached his duty to Mary? The injury to the one has no necessary
economic or other connection with the benefit to the other. Accord-
ing to the basic principle of restitution, it was not shown that the
defendant's enrichment was at the expense of the plaintiff.
Deprecating sister state cases to the contrary, the Simonds
Court appealed to general principles of equity from Aristotle to
Cardozo to rise above "legal formalisms" and grasp the "equity of
the transaction," which the Court described as "clear."U It is ques-
tionable whether the Court's departure from received forms of law
led to the achievement of the elusive quality of justice. If not, the
result was simply a confiscation of the widow's exempt assets to
satisfy a duty owed by the deceased husband to his former wife.
1 Gegan's Law: The tendency for any conclusion to be called clear is in inverse ratio to
the reasons available to support it. Corollary: Clarity tends to obscure and absolute clarity
obscures absolutely.
[Vol. 53:593
